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In late September the Risk Man-agement Agency (RMA) of USDA released the results of commis-
sioned studies that calculated the 
rate of return that U.S. crop insur-
ance companies have received from 
selling multi-peril crop insurance 
(MPCI) (http://www.rma.usda.gov/
pubs/2009/millimanhistoricalrate.
pdf). Since 2000, the average annual 
rate of return on equity has been 19 
percent. The study also estimated 
that a reasonable rate of return over 
the same time period for this line of 
business would be about 11 percent. 
One straightforward interpretation 
of this difference is that since 2000, 
the crop insurance industry has 
received a rate of return that is 72 
percent higher than what would be 
needed to induce private companies 
to participate in the crop insurance 
program. 
The insurance industry dis-
agrees with this assessment of prof-
itability. In a report released in early 
October (http://www.ag-risk.org/
NCISPUBS/SpecRPTS/GrantThornton/
Grant_Thornton_Report-2009_FINAL.
pdf ) the industry argues that “the 
MPCI program is not as profi table 
as the P&C (Property and Casualty) 
industry and writing MPCI entails 
greater risk.” Clearly there is a differ-
ence of opinion here. 
Arguments over the profi tability 
of the crop insurance industry are 
to be expected and have occurred 
often. An arm of government, be 
it the Government Accountability 
Offi ce (GAO) or the RMA, releases 
a report that fi nds excess industry 
profi ts. The industry responds with 
arguments about the fl awed account-
ing standards used by government 
analysts and then releases its own 
report that allows it to argue that 
it cannot absorb any cuts in the 
taxpayer subsidies that it receives 
because the industry is already 
undercompensated. 
What should Congress con-
clude? Should members and their 
staff believe the industry reports 
that further cuts will reduce indus-
try profi ts to the point at which 
companies will not be willing to par-
ticipate in the program? Or should 
they believe the GAO and RMA 
reports that conclude that substan-
tial cuts can be made because the 
industry is overcompensated? 
Although economists are often 
maligned for their lack of ability to 
be precise in offering prescriptions 
for what ails the economy, their con-
cepts and analytical tools can often 
give insights into competing argu-
ments. An examination of how the 
crop insurance industry operates 
and competes provides a simple 
and reasonably accurate measure of 
the amount of excess profi ts the in-
dustry receives. This measure esti-
mates that industry subsidies could 
be reduced by more than a billion 
dollars without adverse impacts on 
program effectiveness.
Revenue and Costs in the 
Insurance Industry
Insurance companies obtain rev-
enue from premiums paid by their 
customers and obtain additional 
revenue from invested capital. This 
revenue must cover claims paid 
out, the cost of adjusting claims, 
any cost of reinsurance, as well as 
other overhead costs such as sala-
ries. Profi ts are positive when total 
revenue exceeds total costs. The big 
difference between the crop insur-
ance industry and unsubsidized 
insurance industries is that about 
80 percent of the premium revenue 
that would be paid by customers is 
actually paid by taxpayers. This 80 
percent number consists of the 60 
percent of premiums that are paid 
by taxpayers and the 20 percent ex-
pense reimbursement. In addition, 
taxpayers provide crop insurance 
companies subsidized reinsurance 
in exchange for the requirement 
that the companies must sell insur-
ance to all farmers in areas in which 
they do business.
That such a large portion of pre-
mium is paid by taxpayers height-
ens the importance of determining 
whether the RMA report of a 72 per-
cent excessive rate of return does, 
in fact, accurately describe the cur-
rent situation. 
Competition in the Crop 
Insurance Industry
In most lines of insurance, as with 
most other industries, companies 
compete on the quality of their 
product and on price. This compe-
tition is what keeps industry profi t 
levels from getting too far above or 
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below the levels needed to keep the 
industry viable. But, as discussed in 
the accompanying article on page 
4, RMA has the responsibility of set-
ting premium rates. In addition, its 
governing board, the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation, determines 
which products companies can of-
fer. Thus all crop insurance compa-
nies sell the same products at the 
same price. 
Companies do compete, how-
ever. Those companies that are best 
at using the government-provided 
reinsurance make more money 
than others. In addition, companies 
compete with each other for market 
share by competing for crop insur-
ance agents’ books of business. All 
crop insurance policies must be 
sold by crop insurance agents. Most 
agents are independent so they can 
route their policies through any of 
the crop insurance companies that 
service policies in their regions. 
Agents are more likely to offer their 
books of business to the highest 
bidder. Thus competition for market 
share is conducted in terms of agent 
commissions. Those companies that 
pay higher commissions will tend to 
increase their market share.
Price as an Indicator of Profi ts
In a competitive market, profi ts will 
accrue to the factors of production 
that are limited in supply. In profes-
sional baseball, increases in revenue 
typically show up in infl ated salaries 
to star players because they are in 
limited supply and owners compete 
for their services. In farming, an 
increase in the price of crops tends 
to increase land rents because there 
is only so much land to go around. 
In economic terms, the factor that is 
most limited in supply is the residu-
al claimant of any excess profi ts to 
an industry.
In the crop insurance industry, 
though, as mentioned earlier, the 
only price that refl ects competi-
tion among companies is the price 
they pay agents for their books of 
business. Thus a good measure of 
the degree of excessive taxpayer 
compensation to the industry is to 
look at the only price in the indus-
try—the agent commission—that 
is free to adjust. If compensation to 
the industry is excessive, then we 
should see the price paid to agents 
for their books of business increase 
as companies seek to expand. If 
compensation to the industry is too 
low, then we should see the price 
paid to agents drop as companies 
attempt to cut their losses. 
Agent Commissions
Figure 1 shows one measure of 
agent commission. Although agent 
commission rates have increased 
from just below 16 percent to about 
17 percent of total premium, there is 
no obvious evidence in Figure 1 that 
agent commissions have been bid 
up in response to excessive profi ts 
in the industry.
However, the cost of selling 
and servicing a crop insurance 
policy and running a crop insur-
ance agency is not proportionate to 
the amount of premium collected. 
In crop insurance, a farmer’s pre-
mium will double if the price of 
the insured crop doubles. But the 
cost of servicing the policy will be 
constant. A better measure of agent 
commissions is the dollar amount of 
commission paid per policy sold. As 
shown in Figure 2, commission re-
ceived per policy sold has increased 
by a factor of almost four. 
One measure of the extent to 
which the industry is overcompen-
sated is the difference between the 
minimum amount agents would ac-
cept to sell crop insurance policies 
and the amount that they currently 
receive. This measure assumes 
that all other factors in the crop 
insurance industry, such as staff or 
executive salaries, are paid a com-
petitive amount. An overestimate of 
the minimum amount of compensa-
tion required to sell crop insurance 
policies is the amount received 
in 2001. This is an over-estimate 
because there was no shortage of 
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agents willing to sell crop insurance 
in 2001, which implies that this 
amount gave them a good return on 
their labor.
Of course, we should increase 
this 2001 amount by general wage 
infl ation to refl ect the prevailing 
increase in wage rates. If we make 
this adjustment, then the minimum 
amount of compensation needed 
in 2008 to induce crop insurance 
agents to provide the same level 
of service that they provided in 
2001 is $426 per policy. The actual 
compensation was $1,442. Thus, 
the amount by which agents were 
able to increase their compensation 
because of increased profi ts of the 
crop insurance companies in 2008 
was $1,015 per policy. 
There were 1.148 million poli-
cies sold in 2008. So an estimate of 
the amount of excessive compensa-
tion that crop insurance companies 
receive from taxpayers is $1.165 
billion ($1,015 per policy multiplied 
by 1.148 million polices). More spe-
cifi cally, if taxpayer subsidies to the 
crop insurance industry had been 
$1.165 billion lower in 2008, then 
the level of service that existed in 
2001 would have existed in 2008. 
And, as stated earlier, this estimate 
of the amount of excess compensa-
tion to the industry is too low if the 
salaries of other personnel involved 
with the industry increased faster 
than industry norms.
It is diffi cult to compare this 
$1.165 billion estimate of over-
compensation with the 72 percent 
excessive rate of return estimate 
made in the RMA report because of 
different methods used. But these 
two estimates are clearly consis-
tent with an overall conclusion that 
taxpayer support of the U.S. crop 
insurance industry is excessive. To 
better reconcile different estimates 
of whether subsidies are too high or 
too low, government analysts could 
make a simple adjustment: remove 
agent commissions as an unavoid-
able cost of business. As explained, 
agent commissions are determined 
by the level of subsidies provided to 
the industry. Only the level of com-
mission that would induce agents to 
quit the crop insurance business is 
an unavoidable expense. 
Ways to Cut (But Is There a Will?)
Industry revenue from underwriting 
gains and expense reimbursement 
totaled $3.2 billion in 2008. Thus, a 
cut of $1.165 billion would have left 
the industry with about $2 billion 
in revenue. The two ways that this 
amount of money could be reduced 
is a combination of a reduction in av-
erage underwriting gains along with 
a change in the way that expense 
reimbursements are calculated. 
Underwriting gains, though, 
give companies incentives to police 
fraud in the program. But RMA 
could increase the amount of un-
derwriting gains that companies 
give back to the agency in years in 
which there are gains (the quota 
share) in exchange for the agency 
taking on more of the losses in loss 
years—which would cut average 
taxpayer costs. 
To cut expense reimbursement, 
RMA could pay companies a fl at 
amount per policy, say $426 per 
policy. This would amount to about 
$500 million per year to pay agent 
Figure 1. Agent commissions as a percentage of total premium
Source: Table 5.1 of Grant Thornton report for National Crop Insurance Services, 
October 2, 2009.
Figure 2. Commissions received per U.S. crop insurance policy sold
Continued on page 8
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Are farmers paying too much for crop insurance? It sure seems so, at least in the Corn 
Belt. With the exception of 2008 
when a large drop in price triggered 
payments, Corn Belt farmers have 
generally paid more into the pro-
gram than they have gotten out, de-
spite Congress’s intention that farm-
ers get at least two dollars for each 
dollar they pay into the program.
But answering this question 
is more diffi cult than just looking 
at the recent pattern of premiums 
paid and claims received. How crop 
insurance premiums are determined 
is quite complex. A few actuaries in 
USDA’s Risk Management Agency 
(RMA), a few actuaries outside of 
RMA, and a handful of university 
professors sort of know what is go-
ing on. However, given the growing 
importance of premium setting in 
the U.S. crop insurance program, 
it is important for more people to 
know, at least in general, how these 
premiums are determined. 
In the public/private partnership 
that governs the U.S. crop insurance 
program, the private sector sells 
policies, adjusts claims, and submits 
data to RMA. The government’s role 
is to reimburse companies for their 
costs, provide reinsurance, and set 
all premiums. While most attention 
by the interested public has focused 
on companies’ large underwriting 
profi ts and agents’ extraordinary 
commissions in recent years, much 
less attention has been paid to the 
premium-setting part of the pro-
gram. But how much the government 
says crop insurance companies can 
charge for the various insurance 
Drought Tolerance and Risk in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program
products plays a central role in deter-
mining how much farmers pay for 
their coverage and how much the 
overall program costs taxpayers. 
Congress has instructed RMA 
to set premiums to achieve a tar-
get loss ratio (indemnities paid out 
divided by total premium charged) 
of 1.0. How RMA tries to achieve this 
target loss ratio is complicated by 
the fact that most farmers today buy 
revenue insurance, which can pay 
off when either market price or yield 
drops. But RMA determines how 
much companies can charge for the 
yield part of the coverage following 
fairly standard insurance guidelines 
for property and casualty insurance.
Insurance companies maintain 
large databases of historic loss data 
to help them determine how much 
they should charge for insurance. 
By looking back in time and across 
customers, companies calculate how 
much they have paid out in insur-
ance claims relative to the total 
amount of insurance that their cus-
tomers have purchased. The ratio of 
losses paid to coverage purchased is 
called the loss-cost ratio. Loss-cost 
ratios are used to set rates instead 
of just total payments made to ac-
count for variations in the amount 
of insurance that is purchased over 
time and across regions. For ex-
ample, an expensive home in 1970 
may have cost $200,000, whereas 
the comparable home today might 
be valued at $2 million. A $10,000 
claim paid in 1970 (5 percent of the 
value of the home) is comparable to 
a $100,000 claim today. If the risk of 
insuring homes is no greater today, 
then the probability of making a 5 
percent loss payment in 1970 equals 
the probability of making a 5 percent 
loss payment today. By expressing 
claims paid as a percentage, insur-
ance companies can use past data to 
determine what they are likely to pay 
out in the future.
The use of past loss-cost ratios 
is the foundation for how RMA 
determines the extent to which 
there is yield risk. The loss-cost 
procedure is valid if the risk of a 30 
percent loss today is the same as 
the risk of a 30 percent loss in the 
past. If it is, then RMA can simply 
calculate how often crop insurance 
companies have paid out different 
percentage losses to estimate the 
current probability of paying out 
losses of different magnitudes. The 
assumption of a constant percent-
age loss risk over time underlies the 
premium rates for all the popular 
crop insurance products, including 
Revenue Assurance, Crop Revenue 
Coverage, Actual Production His-
tory, Group Risk Income Protection, 
and the Group Risk Plan. Although 
this assumption is convenient for 
setting premium rates, there is 
mounting evidence that crop yields 
today are less susceptible to losses 
than in the past. 
Are Crop Risks Getting Lower? 
Figure 1 provides the fi rst piece of 
evidence that crop risk has been 
decreasing over time. As shown, 
While most attention by the 
interested public has 
focused on companies’ 
large underwriting profi ts 
and agents’ extraordinary 
commissions in recent 
years, much less 
attention has been paid 
to the premium-setting part 
of the program. 
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the overall loss ratio for the U.S. 
crop insurance program has indeed 
been declining. The average loss 
ratio from 1989 to 1999 was 1.12. The 
average from 2000 to 2008 has been 
0.88. And there has not been a loss 
ratio above 1.0 since 2003. However, 
a declining loss ratio, in and of itself, 
is not proof that crop risk has been 
reduced. For example, the decline 
could be due to good growing-season 
weather. There have not been wide-
spread losses in the Corn Belt due 
to drought since 1988, and Corn Belt 
states account for more than half 
of the total liability in the program. 
Before we can conclude that risk has 
been reduced, we need to account 
for whether the decline in loss ratios 
could have been caused by a string 
of better-than-average growing sea-
sons that could change in the future. 
Another piece of evidence that 
yield risk for corn is lower now than 
in the past is that RMA has ap-
proved substantially lower premium 
rates for farmers who plant biotech 
corn. The companies that produce 
this biotech corn, which expresses 
toxins that kill corn borers and corn 
rootworms, argue that their new 
hybrids are more vigorous and can 
better withstand adverse growing 
conditions. After seeing company 
data, the RMA agreed.
Because biotech corn has been 
planted widely now for some time, 
it seems reasonable to expect that 
evidence of lower corn yield risk 
should be discernable in yield data. 
Findings from a new research report 
(Yu and Babcock, 2009) support 
biotech company claims: corn yield 
losses from drought are much lower 
today than in the past. The report 
also shows that not all of the reduc-
tion in yield risk is due to increased 
insect control because soybean 
yield losses to drought have also 
declined. Next, we review what the 
report found and the implications 
for premiums and taxpayer cost 
from crop insurance.
Measuring Changes in Drought 
Tolerance of Corn and Soybeans
If corn and soybean yields are 
less susceptible to drought, then a 
drought of a given severity in 1980 
would have resulted in larger yield 
losses than if the same drought had 
hit this year. Thus, a straightforward 
method for making such a determi-
nation is to compare yield losses 
to drought in the 1980s with more 
recent yield losses. 
The fi rst step is to construct a 
measure of drought severity. In the 
Corn Belt, a lack of rainfall causes 
the most damage if accompanied 
by high temperatures. A good index 
of drought would show severity in-
creasing as hot and dry conditions 
increase (see the paper by Yu and 
Babcock for further details). 
The second step is to construct 
a measure of yield loss. We accom-
plished this by estimating what yield 
would be in any year absent hot and 
dry conditions and then comparing 
what yield actually was in the years 
of hot and dry conditions. There are 
two relevant measures of yield loss. 
Under the lost-cost ratio method of 
rate making, yield loss expressed as 
a percentage is assumed to stay con-
stant over time. So we are interested 
in calculating yield loss expressed 
as a percentage of what yield would 
have been without drought. A sec-
ond measure is the number of bush-
els lost. If the percentage of yield 
loss is constant over time, and trend 
yields are growing over time, then 
the absolute number of bushels lost 
due to a drought of a given severity 
must be increasing. 
The fi nal step is to fi nd yield 
data that can be matched up with 
the drought index data. The longest-
running consistent data series on 
yield is published by the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS). Measuring how the impact 
of drought on yield has changed 
over time obviously requires obser-
vations of drought throughout the 
time period studied. Although the 
incidence of drought has decreased 
over time, with no major drought 
affecting Iowa yields since the 1980s, 
there have been enough droughts 
in certain regions of Illinois and In-
diana in the 1980s and from 2000 to 
2008 to allow good measurements. 
Figure 2 shows how yield losses 
from droughts of different severi-
ties in the years 1980–1989 compare 
with yield losses from comparable 
droughts in 2000–2008 for corn and 
soybeans. Drought severity is indi-
cated by the value of the drought 
index on the horizontal axis, and 
yield loss is the average loss either 
in bushels per acre or percentage 
Source: National Summary of Business Reports, USDA RMA.
Figure 1. Loss ratios for the U.S. crop insurance program from 1989 
to 2008
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els per acre. Thus, the data seem 
to support the idea that corn has 
become more drought tolerant over 
time. The evidence for soybeans is a 
bit mixed. Percentage yield loss due 
to drought is lower in 2000–2008 than 
in 1980–1989 for all droughts except 
for the most severe category, while 
there is no clear pattern for bushel-
per-acre loss. But for both corn and 
soybeans, the evidence seems strong 
that the percentage of yield lost due 
to drought has declined over time.
To estimate the magnitude of 
these changes in drought-induced 
losses, we use an equation that 
shows how yield has changed over 
time because of better management 
and technology and how drought’s 
impacts on yields have changed 
over time. The estimated equation 
can also be used to determine if the 
increase in drought tolerance is sta-
tistically signifi cant.
The estimated equation is 
available in the working paper. The 
hypothesis of increasing drought 
tolerance for corn is strongly sup-
ported by the data. For soybeans, 
the hypothesis of increasing drought 
tolerance when yield loss is mea-
sured as a percentage of yield is also 
strongly supported by the data. Soy-
bean yield loss measured in bushels 
per acre is estimated to be practi-
cally unchanged over time. Figure 3 
shows the estimated bushel-per-acre 
loss for corn for droughts of differ-
ent severities. As shown, the esti-
mated number of corn bushels that 
would be lost to drought is lower in 
2008 than in 1988. The gap between 
drought losses in those two years 
widens considerably when losses 
are expressed as a percentage of 
drought-free expected yield, as 
shown in Figure 4. For corn, a return 
of a 1988 drought would reduce 
yields by 31 percent in 2008, which 
is far below the 45 percent losses 
from the same drought in 1988. This 
is a reduction in yield risk from 
drought of 31 percent. For soybeans, 
there has been less of an increase in 
drought tolerance than for corn. But 
for a 1988-style drought, estimated 
losses have been reduced from 28 
percent of drought-free expected 
yields to 23 percent—a reduction in 
drought risk of about 18 percent.
Implications of Increased 
Drought Tolerance
The maintained hypothesis that 
underpins all premium rates for 
Figure 3. Estimated bushel-per-acre corn losses from drought in 1988 
and 2008
of yield in the counties that had 
droughts of the given severity. As 
expected, the greater the drought 
severity, the greater the yield losses. 
For corn, losses in the 1980s are 
greater than losses since 2000 for 
each category of drought severity 
when loss is measured in percentage 
terms, and for most drought catego-
ries when loss is measured in bush-
Figure 2. Estimated yield losses from drought in the years 1980–1989 and 
2000–2008
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Figure 5. Percentage by which premium rates for Group Risk Plan 
insurance are too high (1980–2009 premiums, assuming constant yield 
losses due to drought)
Figure 4. Estimated percentage losses from drought for corn and soybeans 
in 1988 and 2008
the U.S. crop insurance data of a 
constant percentage yield risk over 
time is not supported by the data. 
Both corn and soybean yields in 
the Corn Belt are more tolerant of 
drought today than they were in the 
past. Because drought is such an 
important source of yield risk, this 
fi nding implies that Corn Belt crop 
insurance premiums are too high. 
To determine the extent to 
which crop insurance rates may be 
too high, the premiums needed to 
cover losses due to drought from 
1980 to 2008 under the assumption 
that percentage yield loss due to 
drought has been constant over time 
were calculated for four counties in 
Illinois and Indiana for each crop 
under the Group Risk Plan (GRP)—
a county-based yield insurance 
program. The premiums needed to 
cover these losses assuming declin-
ing percentage losses as shown in 
Figure 4 were also calculated. The 
differences were then subtracted 
from the actual GRP rates. This re-
sults in adjusted GRP premium rates 
that account for increasing drought 
tolerance. Figure 5 shows the per-
centages by which current GRP rates 
in those counties are too high. As 
expected given the fi ndings in Figure 
4, the percentage over-rating for corn 
is generally much greater than for 
soybeans. The anomalous result for 
Spencer County corn is due to a low 
percentage of the GRP corn rate that 
is accounted for by drought. In Peo-
ria County, the unloaded GRP pre-
mium rate for 90 percent corn cover-
age is 3.41 percent. Given increased 
drought tolerance, the premium 
rate should be 1.06 percent. This 
large difference shows the potential 
impact of accounting for increased 
drought tolerance of crops. For 
soybeans the difference is smaller 
but still signifi cant. In Jasper County 
the unloaded GRP rate is 2.22 per-
cent. Accounting for the increased 
drought tolerance of soybeans would 
drop the GRP rate to 1.52 percent.
The impact of lower premiums 
on farmers is straightforward: if 
premiums were to drop by 40 per-
cent, then the premium that farmers 
would have to pay for the same level 
of coverage would fall by 40 per-
cent. Consequently, farmers would 
greatly benefi t if increased drought 
tolerance were accounted for in 
crop insurance. The amount that 
crop insurance companies receive 
as an expense reimbursement would 
also drop by the same percentage 
because expense reimbursements 
Continued on page 8
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Insurance Industry
Continued from page 3
commissions. Then RMA could add 
in so much per policy for claims ad-
justment and so much per policy for 
salaries and other overhead. 
The chances that Congress will 
soon embrace a cut in funding for a 
program that has generated 20 per-
cent annual salary growth for crop 
insurance agents who reside in rural 
areas seems pretty remote. After 
all, Congress and the administration 
are currently borrowing money to 
create jobs to keep unemployment 
down. But eventually, borrowed 
money has to be paid back. And the 
only way to pay back money is to 
raise taxes or cut expenditures. But 
there are economic costs associated 
with raising tax revenue, so federal 
programs should be scrutinized for 
effi ciency. In agriculture, the place 
to start is the crop insurance pro-
gram. There is no doubt the same 
level of service can be provided to 
farmers at much lower cost. ◆
are calculated as a proportion of pre-
miums. This drop in expense reim-
bursement could be lower if farmers 
responded to a premium decrease by 
buying more expensive coverage. 
In addition, a drop in premium 
rates would increase loss ratios, 
which would decrease underwrit-
ing gains. Because taxpayers do not 
benefi t as much from underwriting 
gains as they lose when there are 
underwriting losses, such a change 
would likely benefi t taxpayers. Thus, 
taxpayers and farmers would likely 
be net winners from an adjustment to 
crop insurance premiums to account 
for increasing drought tolerance.
A Full Accounting
The efforts of biotechnology com-
panies seem to have paid off in an 
unanticipated manner by making 
corn hybrids better able to with-
stand drought conditions. Modern, 
herbicide-resistant soybeans also 
seem, for more enigmatic reasons, to 
have increasing drought resistance. 
In addition, both crops are being 
managed by larger and perhaps 
more able managers. And better 
management leads to more timely 
fi eld operations, which could result 
in increasing drought tolerance.
The large impacts of this newly 
evident drought tolerance in corn and 
soybeans may be dwarfed if seed com-
panies are in fact successful in their 
targeted efforts to reduce yield losses 
due to drought. As new technologies 
Drought Tolerance and Risk in the U.S. 
Crop Insurance Program
Continued from page 7
become available, it is important that 
the crop insurance industry and Risk 
Management Agency alter the way 
they determine crop insurance rates 
so the system can directly refl ect the 
lower risks.
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Iowa Ag Review
This issue of the Iowa Ag Re-view closes out the 15th vol-ume of this quarterly publica-
tion. Over the last 15 years we have 
strived to present timely informa-
tion and insight into the important 
issues that impact Iowa and U.S. 
agriculture. Aided by the explosive 
growth of the Internet and Google, 
the Iowa Ag Review truly has a 
worldwide audience. We regularly 
receive comments on our articles 
from as far away as Nepal and Aus-
tralia, as well as from more nearby 
towns in Northwest Iowa. 
Many readers have found the 
Iowa Ag Review’s even-handed analy-
sis of controversial topics a welcome 
respite from the never-ending fl ow 
of self-serving studies advocating 
particular policy positions. If we do 
break from our non-advocacy posi-
tion it is usually in favor of policy re-
forms that cut wasteful government 
spending or that provide valuable 
public goods because taxpayers 
and the general public are the least-
represented groups in legislative 
bodies. Economists have a long and 
esteemed history of pointing out 
how most policies are funded by the 
many to favor the few. 
CARD’s research on the impor-
tant issues affecting agriculture 
will continue. But it will no longer 
be reported in the Iowa Ag Review. 
The reality of shrinking budgets 
combined with increased demands 
on ever-scarcer faculty time means 
that we can no longer afford the 
time and money needed to keep the 
publication going on a regular basis. 
In its place, beginning in 2010, 
CARD will begin a new publication 
series titled CARD Policy Briefs. 
This series will contain the same 
type and length of articles that 
have been published in the Iowa Ag 
Review. Entries in the new series 
will appear on our Web site when a 
topic or issue seems ripe for analy-
sis or when CARD research needs 
to reach a broader audience. 
We will set up an electronic 
alert system for those of you who 
want to be notifi ed when new 
articles are posted. Please send 
your e-mail address to card-pub@
iastate.edu or fi ll out and mail the 
postage-paid card below.
End of a Long Run
We’ve enjoyed connecting with 
you these many years through the 
Iowa Ag Review. We invite you to 
continue to follow our research 
and economic analysis of impor-
tant issues in agriculture at our 
Web site: www.card.iastate.edu.
Bruce A. Babcock
Director
Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University
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